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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is twofold: to show the positive growth effect on economies 
through steady stock market growth, and to analyze the performance of India’s stock markets 
over the last decade on national growth. I start out in Section I with economic analyses of the 
high correlation between stock market indicators and the development of all financial 
institutions. Studies conducted by other economists prove correlations between the stock 
market and other macroeconomic indicators such as liquidity, level of banking, volatility, 
consumption, income and stock prices. Section II is a detailed case analysis of the Bombay 
Stock Exchange (BSE) that has for decades failed to provide substantial growth to the Indian 
economy. After the balance of payments crisis in 1991, the BSE underwent major 
management changes such as the creation of the Securities and Exchange Board Commission 
and the National Stock Exchange that have undoubtedly improved the stock market’s role. 
There has been a significant increase in the BSE’s role in Indian markets. Nonetheless, in 
order to make the stock exchange efficient, continued efforts are needed to restore market 
optimism by fighting off mass corruption, and by guaranteeing domestic and foreign investors 
a functional regulatory system. 
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SECTION I: The Stock Market and the National Economy 
 
I.  The Positive Growth Cycle Correlation: Introduction 
 With the stock market representing at times the bulk of the economy in terms of GDP, 
changes in capital markets affect national economic well-being, and inversely, changes in the 
economy affect the capital markets. In the past, stock markets were considered unimportant 
for growth, while the banking industry was encouraged to expand (World Development 
Report, 1989). This was because more corporate capital is raised from banks instead of equity 
issues. But as Joan Robinson points out, economic growth creates a demand for a variety of 
financial services, forcing eventual expansion into the equity markets, so that “where 
enterprise leads, finance follows” – a positive growth cycle correlation (Robinson, 1952). 
. There is enough proof to show that developed stock markets result in a higher growth 
rate of economic development. Cross-country studies done between stock market 
development and financial intermediary development reveal that most stock market indicators 
are highly correlated with the development and efficient functioning of banks, non-banking 
financial corporations, and private insurance companies and pension funds (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine, p. 293). The more developed the stock market, the more developed the financial 
intermediaries, promoting positive growth at both ends. 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine analysed a selection of five countries with high market 
capitalisation to GDP ratio greater than 1 were compared with five others with a ratio less 
than 0.1 (p. 292). The developed, large stock markets were found to be more liquid, more 
financially integrated, less volatile, with close to perfect information, internationally accepted 
accounting procedures building credibility, extensively liberalised markets, and with a high 
turnover velocity. I will discuss each of these factors separately analysing how, in particular 
they affect financial systems in developing countries, which will lead to my conclusion at the 
beginning of Section II. I will also present some dated studies that contribute economic 
 
 
http://GLJLWDOFRPPRQVLZXHGXXDXMH 
4 
growth to stock market growth, which in turn, results from growth in corporate profits. 
Finally, with all these ‘positive growth correlations’ in mind, I will analyse why India, a 
developing country, has been unable to develop its stock markets to competitive levels, in a 
three step analysis: the Indian economy before and during liberalisation, shortcomings of the 
Bombay Stock Exchange, and recent attempts for better regulation. 
II.  Analysis 
 A recent study conducted by Levine and Zervos look at 49 ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries 
between 1976 and 1993 to measure stock markets’ contribution to growth, using eight 
macroeconomic indicators (Levine and Zervos, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 1622). The strongest correlation is with liquidity, where the most liquid stock markets 
tend to grow fastest. (Countries with large stock markets don’t necessarily grow more quickly 
than smaller ones). Liquidity is important because savers are weary of tying up their assets, 
boosting bank credit and investment. Such a market allows savers to sell their shares easily 
allowing those in need of capital, like firms, to invest in portfolios. The total value 
traded/GDP ratio measures the number of stocks traded in relation to the size of the economy. 
If averaged over time, this ratio measures the ease of trading; hence, if trading is costly the 
statistics will correspond to an illiquid market.  
It has been shown that “countries with the most liquid stock markets in 1976, both, 
accumulated more capital and enjoyed faster productivity growth over the next 18 years”  
(Levin, 1997),both of which increase the rate of economic growth. The turnover ratio, which 
is the number of shares traded divided by market capitalisation, records the cost of financial 
transactions. A high turnover ratio is associated with low costs and is present in well-
developed stock markets. The link between liquidity and economic growth is by far the 
strongest, proving the importance of a well-developed and liquid stock market for accelerated 
economic growth. 
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Liquid markets will grow fastest with a well-developed banking sector where both will 
complement each other, expanding trading opportunities. Nonetheless, the two indicators – 
liquidity, and the level of banking measured by bank credit/GDP, are fully capable of 
affecting economic growth separately. At times, banks focus only on long run investment 
projects and accumulating information about managers and future firm prospects. On the 
other hand, stock markets can provide liquidity and low volatility. All of these four factors 
complement each other and can promote exponential growth. Research confirms that they 
work together resulting in higher returns for investors and provide greater financing 
opportunities for long run growth. In emerging markets, high stock market liquidity coincides 
with more bond offerings and bank loans as the means of investment financing. Consequently, 
the debt-equity ratio rises with more stock market liquidity (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1996); hence, stock market development accompanies bank lending in emerging markets, 
increasing bank credit/GDP. But as Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine observe, as countries 
reach the middle-income bracket ($2000 per capita in 1990), stock markets and non-financial 
intermediaries develop rapidly, and banks end up representing a smaller share of the financial 
system (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, p. 232). 
Volatility of stock markets is yet another measure of economic development. Initially, 
in emerging stock markets, volatility is high because of high concentration of few large stocks 
(e.g., 10 large stocks controlling a high market capitalisation percentage). Such high 
concentration can hamper liquidity by domination of the stock market. As an economy 
liberalises, foreign investors in particular, fear that stock prices will fluctuate a lot on the basis 
of good or bad economic news (Rea, 1996). This can complicate macroeconomic decisions 
such as exchange rate policies. Initially, liberalisation leads to an immediate rise in liquidity 
and volatility. But, with time, opening up to international capital flows reduces stock return 
volatility, critical for good economic growth (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996).  
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 A positive growth correlation exists between stock prices and consumption, where a 
10% rise in America’s stock market has raised consumption by 0.3% (“Wall Street and the 
Economy,” 1996). Similarly, falls in stock prices have led to falls in consumption. A fall in 
share prices also reduces investment.  Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard assert that falling share 
prices precede lower sales and lower profit (Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard). Since firms 
reinvest their profits, the total amount of profits reinvested will decline, lowering the demand 
for capital as well. 
Other studies conducted over the years by Loire and Hamilton show us, the level of 
stock prices are proportionally related to the levels of output, income, unemployment and 
other such macroeconomic measures. And the value of stocks is, in turn, determined by the 
performance of a corporation in terms of its earnings and profits, and also by the expected 
value of the corporation’s future earnings. They continue to point out that the greater the 
mean or expected value of possible changes in earnings (derived from the standard deviation) 
and the greater the confidence, the higher the prices of stocks, ceteris parabis. 
The “large scale of public markets for stocks and bonds in the country, the high 
standards of disclosure imposed upon corporations by the exchanges and the government, and 
the very broad participation of individuals and institutions as investors” have lowered the cost 
of capital to American enterprises (Loire and Hamilton, 1995, p. 213-21).  This is one of the 
problems facing developing countries leaving bank credit ratios and investment in low levels.
 A study published by Solomon in 1995 analyses stock prices against national 
economic growth (Solomon, 1995, p. 213-21). With reliable data dating back to 1874, he used 
the Standard & Poor’s Index of 425 industrial stock prices.  After adjusting for inflation for 
both series, he divided the GNP into two periods: 1874-1913 with an average GNP growth of 
4%, and 1909-1955 with an average growth of 3%; while the average stock price growth was 
at 2.67% and 2% respectively.  He showed that “over the period as a whole, the real growth in 
 
 
http://GLJLWDOFRPPRQVLZXHGXXDXMH 
7 
stock values has proceeded at about two-thirds of the rate of real growth in GNP” (p. 217). 
Since 1955 though, enormous growth rates in the economy have raised the price-earnings 
ratios substantially. Between 1955-1969, the nominal rise in these 425 industrial stock prices 
has been 98% and even when discounted for by the price deflator, the rise has been 35%.  
This gap can be partly explained by the slower rise of corporate profits in relation to real 
economic growth.  
Finally, in 1956, Weston arrived at a similar conclusion on the proportional 
relationships between GNP and the level of stock prices after uncovering similar relationships 
between GNP and sales by business, sales and profits, profits and dividends, and dividends 
and stock prices (Weston, 1956, p. 71-80).  This study shows that even the performance of 
corporations at a microeconomic level determines, in part, the growth of the stock markets.  
 As we have seen, indicators like liquidity, the level of financial intermediation, 
volatility, investment, stock prices, national output, and the level of corporate profits are all 
determinants of the level of real economic growth within the country.  And in turn, each of 
these indicators are affected by the growth of the stock market.  For example, Campbell and 
Shiller successfully use price earnings ratios and dividend-price ratios between 1970 and 2000 
to forecast stock price changes (Campbell and Shiller, NBER Working Paper #8221).  Hence, 
careful analyses should be done when predicting the effects on future national growth.  In the 
next section, after introducing certain aspects of the Indian economy before liberalisation in 
1991-1992, I continue to analyse the state of the Indian stock exchanges since 1980 and recent 
changes made to the whole network that led to its expansion, increasing real growth. 
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SECTION II: Case Study on India’s Stock Markets 
III. The Shape of India’s Stock Markets and Economy: Prior to Liberalisation1 
 The following statistics, averaged over the period 1986-1993 will largely show a 
healthy Indian stock market with potential for remarkable growth just prior to financial 
liberalisation.2  India’s market capitalisation stood at 0.16 and its total value traded/GDP(a) 
(total number of stocks traded/GDP) as 0.06, both of which are very low. This tells us that the 
proportion of the Indian stock market represented only 16% of the whole economy unlike 
Japan’s, for example, which stood at 108%. Instead, India ranked second after the US with 
4,614 listed companies – a number much above the average.3  Thus these listed companies 
must have been smaller enterprises with a small net worth each. The market’s turnover ratio 
was higher than average as well, with a value of 0.50 implying a small “but active market 
with small market capitalisation” (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, “Stock Market Development 
and Financial Intermediaries”).  Its volatility ratio stood at 0.06, better than most developing 
economies, while market concentration was considerably low at 0.22, comparable to most 
developed economies.  
 Apart from the small size of the Indian stock market, all other significant indicators 
show that the financial dynamic was in good shape to allow quick expansion of the stock 
market and fast economic growth.  But this was impossible because financial liberalisation 
only took place in 1990-92, making it one of the last countries to open up its barriers to 
foreign investment.  In addition, the stock market didn’t expand much over the previous 115 
years of its existence because of bad management that resulted in ineffective financial 
intermediation, mass corruption, and numerous scandals in the stock exchanges – all of which 
I address in the following sections.  
                                                 
1 1 USD = 50 Rupees, approx. and 1 crore = 10 million 
2 Statistics taken from Demirgüc-Kunt, Asli and Levine, Ross; “Stock Market Development and Financial 
Intermediaries: Stylised Facts”, World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10(2) 
3 The average includes a selection of high, middle and less developed markets. 
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IV.  Effects of Financial Liberalisation on Growth 
 The outlook of India’s financial policies towards foreigners changed dramatically after 
the 1991 balance of payments crisis. Prior to 1991, foreign direct investment (FDI) was 
limited to a maximum of 40% of joint ventures in most industries. In 1991, the Government 
of India raised this investment barrier to 51% in 35 industries, with immediate approval. In 
1996, further reforms allowed foreign-held equity up to 100%, although mostly in those 
industries dealing with infrastructure. 
 Until September 1992, portfolio investment in Indian firms was prohibited. Over the 
years though, a gradual loosening of these controls led to a portfolio investment of net worth 
$3.85 billion by fiscal year end 1997, i.e., 30 to 40% of equities in any firm with 10% 
representation on any single Foreign Institutional Investor (FII). 63% of this amount came 
from FIIs alone, from their purchases on capital markets. Also in 1996, “India opened its $36 
billion government securities markets to FIIs, taking the first step towards enabling the 
government to sell its debt in overseas markets” (Echeverri-Gent, p. 210).  
Throughout the 1980s, total foreign investment never exceeded $100 million a year, 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) hovered around $158 million in 1991-93.  In 1995-97, 
foreign investment grew to $6.4 billion while FDI reached $2.6 billion. Even then, $2.6 
billion represented only a meagre 2.9% of all FDI to developing countries (IMF, 1997, p. 43). 
With slow economic reform in the 1980s, came greater market capitalisation and 
increased daily turnover of shares, followed by an increased number of mutual fund investors, 
and each of these values multiplied by the mid-1990s. Total market capitalisation as a 
proportion of GDP remained at 5% in 1980, but by 1990, the ratio rose to 13%, and by the 
end of 1993, the proportion stood at 60% of GDP.4  The daily turnover of shares on the BSE 
                                                 
4 Statistics from paragraph taken from Singh, Ajit; “Liberalisation, the Stock Market, and the Market for 
Corporate Control: A Bridge too Far for the Indian Economy?”; India’s Economic Reforms and Development, 
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was at Rs 0.13 billion in 1980-81, which rose to Rs 3.7 billion in 1993-94. By this time, the 
average volume of shares traded daily was approximately 45,000 – a value similar to that in 
the London Stock Exchange.  Finally, the number of mutual fund investors rose from 2 
million to 40 million (compared to the US’s 51 million), and in 1995, the Indian stock market 
boasted 7985 listed companies - the largest number of listed companies in the world.  As 
previously discussed, each one of these trends is consistent with the normal growth process of 
developing stock markets. 
 Financial globalisation and the recurring balance of payments crises forced India to 
rethink its financial and macroeconomic policies in 1991.  The changes mentioned above, the 
liberalisation of capital markets, changed the face of India’s stock exchanges.  I mention in 
further detail below, the shortcomings of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), along with 
some of the restructuring that was done in the mid-1990s with the establishment of the 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the National Stock Exchange (NSE). 
V.  Focus: The Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) 
Amongst India’s 23 stock exchanges, the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) has been by 
far the largest until 1995.  Founded in 1875, it is also Asia’s oldest stock exchange.  The BSE 
lists close to 4500 of India’s 8000 listed companies and accounts for 80% of the $139 billion 
market value present in all the 23 exchanges.  The average daily turnover has more than 
tripled from Rs. 851 crores(a) in 1997-98 to Rs. 2729 crores in 1999-2000, while the average 
daily turnover has multiplied from 80,000 to 295,000.  
VI.  Shortcomings of the BSE (Prior to 1991) 
 The development of the BSE has been on the low priority list during both, the British 
raj, and even during India’s first years of independence under Jawaharlal Nehru as Prime 
Minister.  The Nehruvian state preferred channelling investments through public banks and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Essays for Manmohan Singh; Isher Judge Ahluwalia and I.M.D. Little, editors; Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1998. 
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the state. India’s stock exchanges have been one of the main reasons for its low economic 
growth. (We have already seen its correlation to GNP, etc.).  
In order for a stock exchange to survive and grow, it needs, inherently, to be free of 
government control, or at least, these controls must only act to protect the basic rights of 
investors.  With tight rules and regulations defining how each transaction must take place, this 
bureaucratic environment has stifled any success the exchanges may have had up until 1991.  
Over 100,000 sub-brokers domestically initiate approximately 80% of all transactions 
for individual investors (Echeverri-Gent, India).  These sub-brokers are often employed by 
the 2,200 brokers themselves, but neither one is legally liable for the other’s actions. As a 
result, sub-brokers reduce the transparency of transactions since they do not make available 
information on brokers’ transaction costs, which are negotiable with a ceiling of 2.5% of 
contract values (BSE online, About BSE, Brokerage and Other Transaction Costs).  They try 
their fullest to retain the maximum profits possible. 
 Over the past years, BSE brokers have exploited various India’s stock exchanges to 
their own advantage.  They would maximise returns on individual transactions even if that 
hurt other less important transactions.  As a result, no priority was given to increasing their 
profits by maximising the volume of transactions(a) , which would have contributed more 
profits to the economic growth of the country. 
 This rent seeking behaviour of Indian brokers has been recognised by the government 
of India and even by the membership of the Unit Trust of India: 
…The security business in the country has tended to be in the hands of a few families 
of stockbrokers whose actions are primarily governed by the need to protect their own 
interests and bereft of the interests of the investing public and even obstruct the 
attempts of the Government aimed at making the Stock Exchange efficient instruments 
for mobilising savings of the community for national development… (GOI, 1985, p. 
10) 
 
Not even 5% of the stockbrokers were “properly trained and equipped” (Echeverri-Gent, 
India).  They are often charged for creating unnecessary delays, and malpractices such as 
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“insider trading, concealing speculative trading on their own accounts from stock exchange 
authorities, colluding with promoters to manipulate premia on new issues by buying up shares 
to attract investors and then selling the shares for a profit leaving unsuspecting investors with 
losses, and rigging stock market quotations to illegally enhance profits from options trading” 
(GOI, 1985, p. 9-18). 
 Already unnecessary bureaucratic work is further worsened by the requirement that all 
share certificates and transfer deeds must be signed by the seller before the completion of the 
transaction.  This process should legally be done within 14 days, but allowances can be made 
up to 28 days for those living in remote locations (Echeverri-Gent, India).  In the stock 
market, the prices of stocks can change considerably every few minutes. As a result, clients 
can no longer be assured that their transactions will be worthwhile because within 28 days, 
companies’ stock values could take a dive, and it will take at least another 28 days for clients 
to sell their shares to another buyer. 
 The growing number of Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) face a further problem. 
The maximum number of shares that can be bought in a single lot usually ranges between 10 
and 50 with 100 being the absolute maximum.  This multiplies the amount of paperwork and 
time, if it becomes necessary to conduct several such transactions to acquire the needed 
number of shares. 
 Concerning changes in ownership, companies are required to register all transfers of 
shares within 60 days. This creates a stockpile of share certificates and transfer deeds.  At 
present, the average FII takes over 4 months to complete registration changes, assuming all 
paperwork is in order.  On the other hand, if faulty signatures are discovered, the papers are 
returned to the owners who must then contact the brokers. At times, lack of interest on the 
brokers behalf and other inevitable delays result in the issue taking close to a year to resolve. 
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 To further worsen things, brokers “use the periods between sales and settlement to 
speculate with their clients’ money” (Echeverri-Gent, India, p. 213).  Legally, issuing 
companies do not have to recognise transfers of share ownership.  This delays transfers 
through their registrars, and they use all means possible to keep shares out of circulation 
minimising sales that might depress the price of their stocks.  They can also use their 
influence to avoid hostile takeovers and they can even intentionally sign under false names so 
that they can later nullify transactions (Global Money Management, 1996, p. 2). 
VII.  Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) 
 The government established the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to 
oversee the country’s stock exchanges.  Its creation sought out to legitimise existing capital 
market institutions for the public. SEBI did not receive any statutory powers or legal sanctions 
until 1991, resulting from the urgent need to solve the balance of payments crisis and hence, it 
remained ineffective in resolving well-known problems that plagued India’s capital markets.  
At the same time, international financial institutions pressurised India to better regulate 
financial intermediation.  India’s need to revise its financial and economic situation led to the 
appointment of Manmohan Singh as Finance Minister. 
 SEBI’s legal authority to regulate India’s stock markets meant that companies could 
bypass the Controller of Capital Issues (CCI) in order to enter the capital market. They could 
now set their own prices in accordance with SEBI’s norms. The Board   
strengthened the standards of disclosure on primary markets, introduced prudential 
norms for issues and intermediaries, and streamlined issue procedures. The 1995 
amendment to the SEBI Act for the first time enabled SEBI to file suits against 
violators of its regulations without prior approval of the central government. It 
provided SEBI subpoena powers for records, documents, accounts, and personal 
testimony, and it authorised it to levy fines in for certain violations of its regulations. 
(Echeverri-Gent, India, p. 215)  
 
SEBI’s actions angered India’s stockbrokers and members of the BSE. It took a few strikes 
and upheavals, for the SEBI to gain authority over India’s stock markets. 
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 In 1994, to make the takeover of inefficient firms even more transparent, SEBI issued 
regulations that would also protect minority shareholder interests.  Unnecessary bureaucratic 
procedures, such as getting three approvals for the same transaction were eliminated.  Also, 
measures have been taken under the new code to save jobs and protect shareholders’ and 
creditors’ interests when managing companies were soon to be bankrupt.  Earlier, such 
companies would either be forced to close down, be restructured or be sold. SEBI’s new 
ruling allows takeover bids after companies lose only 50% of their value. 
 Furthermore, the Surveillance Department was set up in August 1995 with staff 
assigned to make “promote and inculcate honourable and just practices of trading transactions 
and to discourage malpractices” (BSE online, About BSE, Safety of the Market).  Some of its 
duties include monitoring price movement of scrips, price movement anomalies and detecting 
market manipulated rigging.  Later, in 1999, it developed an On-line Real Time (ORLT) 
Surveillance System which generates alerts on-line, in real time, based on price and volume 
variations in scrips.  Previously, under pressure due to the extremely rapid growth of the 
National Stock Exchange, the BSE, introduced the Bombay On Line Trading (BOLT) (b) 
system towards the end of 1995. 
VIII.  The National Stock Exchange (NSE) 
 Creating the Indian National Stock Exchange (NSE) was first brought up in November 
1992 upon the BSE’s refusal of SEBI recommendations.  The NSE, much more futuristic and 
user-friendly in its outlook opened for trading equities in October 1994.  Soon after, by the 
end of 1995, the volume of equities traded at NSE outstripped that of the BSE (Tassel 1997).  
By 1997, it linked 145 cities via an on-line satellite-based network. 
 Unlike the BSE, NSE regulations require the rectification of bad trade deliveries 
within 48 hours.  Those deliveries still not rectified are auctioned off to other brokers who 
resolve the problem within a few days, unlike the months taken by the BSE.  In addition, 
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penalty points accumulate once a broker is unable to see through a transaction accurately.  A 
broker with 51 points is fined, while a broker with 100 points is suspended for 5 working 
days. 
 The NSE is owned by state financial institutions and run by professional managers, 
whereas the BSE is both, owned and managed by their own brokers (Echeverri-Gent, India).  
The NSE requires its member brokers to pay a fee for using NSE’s services instead of buying 
seats on the exchange as in practice in the BSE.  Despite the assimilation of BOLT by end 
1995, the BSE’s turnover was $168 million by June 1996, while the NSE’s turnover increased 
to $426 million.  Although BOLT has made the BSE more efficient that it has ever been, one 
of its flaws is that it still requires brokers to quote prices. 
 The absence of share depositories (Clearing house systems)(a) does not allow 
centralisation of share collection.  In October 1996, the NSE opened up the country’s first 
such depository, National Securities Depository Ltd., in coordination with the Industrial 
Development Bank of India and the Unit Trust of India.  But, its market capitalisation value 
has remained small.  This value in June 1997 was less than $750,000 (0.5% of total market 
capitalisation), although soon agreements were made with companies to increase this 
representation to 25% of the total market capitalisation within the following years. 
IX. Problems that continue to face the Indian stock markets: Scandals in the BSE 
 Of late, India’s stock markets have been plagued by multiple defrauding scams, 
despite increased regulation and transparency of information.  A Mumbai-based stockbroker, 
Harshad Mehta has been accused of “siphoning off Rs. 55billion ($ 1.18 billion) in a 
securities scam in 1992” (“Harshad Mehta opposes charges in fraud case,” 2001).  An 
investigation ensuing from mid-1998 has him on trial for allegedly diverting Rs. 6.8billion 
($147 million) from India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation between 1989 and 1991.  Yet 
another recent scandal involves broker Ketan Parekh who has been accused of defrauding the 
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Bank of India of close to US $30 million (“Indian broker denied bail again,” 2001).  First, he 
acquired substantial loans by violation banking norms, and then, once the stock value fell, he 
couldn’t repay his debts.  A series of similar scams has been responsible for various crashes in 
share prices over the past 10 years, with the latest one being on March 2, 2001 with the sell 
off by Parekh. 
 SEBI has banned three companies, BPL, Sterlite and Videocon from trading for 
multiple years for manipulating stock prices.  The Exchange Board also froze operations of 
Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) and Nirmal Bank Group, making CSFB the first non-
Indian broker to be shuttered (“Indian brokerage head arrested,” 2001). Involving yet another 
company, First Global, the chairman, Shankar Sharma has been arrested on charges for 
buying 14.5% stake in Tehelka.com in July 2000 knowing fully well of the effects on the 
stock value because of their soon to be released report on the arms and bribery scandal in the 
Government of India, involving officials in high posts.  In a separate case, Subramanian 
Swamy has documented concrete examples on how Reliance Industries Ltd. (RIL) raised Rs. 
1000 crore(a) ($217.4 million) by a fresh public issue and hid the money at 0% interest as 
loans with 250 family-owned companies.  Then, these companies bought RIL shares in order 
to hike up RIL’s stock price (Swamy, 2001). 
 The SEBI has come under a lot of scrutiny as an ineffective regulator, especially due 
to its own shady involvement in the proposed UTI and GTB Bank merger that was called off 
on April 4, 2001.  It has been confirmed that the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the SEBI 
were aware of the price rigging of GTB much before the proposed merger date (“How RBI 
was aware of GTB rigging,” 2001).  Perhaps, the RBI and SEBI had something to benefit by 
not informing UTI Bank about this price rigging.  This high price would have significantly 
affected the swap ratio for the banks shares, giving GTB’s shareholders an unfair advantage. 
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X.  The Stock Market in Turmoil5 
On budget day, February 28, 2001, the BSE 30-share sensitive index (Sensex) went up 
by 177 points. On March 1, the RBI cut the Bank Rate from 7.5% to 7% per annum and the 
market went up by 24 points.  But on March 2, the Sensex fell by 176 points triggering an 
investigation by the Union Finance Ministry.  On March 5, the index fell by 97 points and on 
March 7, Automated Lending and Borrowing Mechanism (ALBM) rates on select scrips rose 
80-100%.  On March 8, the BSE president, Mr. Anand Rathi was asked to demit office due to 
involvement in the market crash.  The payment crisis began on March 9 and the Sensex 
dipped by 175 points.  On March 12, the market fell by a further 14 points. 
 The Government announced moves for corporatisation of stock exchanges and 
Tehelka.com broke the defence deal scam on March 13; the market fell by 227 points.  In 
addition, Mr. Anand Rathi’s firms were debarred from trading, and all broker-directors on the 
BSE were sacked.  The Sensex swung wildly by 900 points during the day. A payment crisis 
hit the Calcutta Stock Exchange and the market fell by 184 points.  On March 15, the market 
recovered 94 points with SEBI’s announcement of fresh guidelines for stock exchange 
functionaries.  On March 16, the market fell 74.5 points after more details of ministers 
involved in the Tehelka.com expose were released.  
Such turmoil in the stock market can have major repercussions on the economy, not 
only by the resulting fall in economic welfare, but also by making investors lose confidence in 
the stock market.  And this is especially unfortunate when such loss results from unnecessary 
scandals or from the lack of proper supervision, events that do not always reflect the current 
state of the economy. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Taken from “Systemic failure behind stock market turmoil”, The Hindu, March 22, 2001 
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XI. Future Success 
 The principal problem in India’s stock markets is the necessary intervention of the 
government to supervise their proper functioning and their lack of liquidity.  But for the real 
success of the stock market, government intervention should only be occasional exceptions. 
Part of the problem arises due to the fact that for the most part, the BSE has been run by 
unqualified professionals.  And given the BSE’s history of corruption, such intervention has, 
ironically, been needed: 
Speculative excess, referred to concisely as a mania and revulsion from such excess in 
the form of crisis, crash or panic can be shown to be, if not inevitable, at least 
historically common… Markets generally work, but occasionally they break down. 
When they do, they require government intervention to provide the public good of 
stability… It happens that crashes and panics are often precipitated by the revelation 
of some misfeasance, malfeasance or malversation (the corruption of officials) 
engendered during the mania. (Kindleberger) 
 
Nonetheless, government intervention must be restricted to ensuring the flow of funds, with 
transparency and accountability.  It should by no means dry up funds through the use of 
bureaucratic regulations.  Oommen A Ninan points out one such regulation where the cost of 
capital for Indians is at 12% real interest on loans, while foreigners are only charged 2-3%.  
Consequently, bank credit as a ratio of the GDP is just 45.6% in India, while the same ratio 
stands at 66.3% in China, 139.4% in Japan, 162.9% in the US, and at 177.7% in Switzerland 
(Swamy, 2001).  Such financials levies leave little incentive for the Indian broker and the 
investor to be honest; creating a vicious cycle where more dishonesty leads to even more 
government intervention, and hence, even more corruption, and less confidence.  If investors 
cannot be assured of efficient, quick and liquid transactions at low cost, the stock market will 
never grow exponentially, as desired. 
 The creation of SEBI has most definitely improved the condition of the BSE, but 
numerous lapses in overseeing problems, and its possible involvement with UTI bank price 
rigging have failed to assure investors of its credibility.  It has also failed to find conclusive 
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results on numerous investigations, many times without holding the person responsible for 
any crimes committed. 
Although India’s economy has been in good shape in terms of its liquidity, the market 
concentration ratio, volatility, total value traded/GDP, and turnover ratio prior to liberalisation 
(refer to section II), the Indian stock exchanges were not allowed to expand due to prohibitive 
restrictions imposed by the government and due to the inefficiency of financial 
intermediation.  Besides these reasons, disorganised fragmentation of the trading system poses 
yet another problem.  About 20 million investors need to go through 23 different stock 
exchanges, some of which exist only on revenues made from inter-exchange arbitrage and 
listing fees.  A first time investor is guaranteed to be misguided and referred to the wrong 
brokers, increasing his total cost of financial intermediation.  As a result, to avoid dealing 
with secondary and at times, non-official brokers, Indian investors prefer the primary market 
of placement in company issues, instead of the secondary market of trading in shares.  This 
trend is exactly the opposite of the fast growing and developed countries (Swamy, 2001). 
 Also, a study conducted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) on “Stock returns and 
volatility in India” shows that the equity market in India is dominated by those investors who 
tend to optimise returns in the short-run.  The study concludes that this adds to the volatility 
of the BSE Sensex, due to frequent alternations “between short phases of bull runs and bear 
hugs”. But, as stated by Levine and Zervos, there is not any strong evidence that this short-
term volatility will hurt the growth of the economy, and every stock market in its early stages 
of development needs to go through this stage as it continues to develop (Levine and Zervos, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1622). 
 In order for the Indian stock markets to continue to expand, further deregulation and 
even further financial liberalisation will need to be carried out.  At the same time, policy 
makers and economists must make sure that the Indian economy is sound enough for it to 
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sustain even further, rapid expansion.  Certain problems within the corporate scene of India 
will need immediate rectification: the lack of cohesion between the government, the SEBI, 
and the stock exchanges; tighter control on the transfer of accurate information to 
shareholders; stricter supervision of the scandals and other forms of corruption; and finally, 
the inefficiency, inconvenience and high costs of financial intermediation. Once such basic 
issues are overcome, only then, can the Indian stock markets reach competitive levels with 
those around the globe. 
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(a) Glossary  
 
 
• Clearing House – Each Exchange maintains a clearing house to act as the central 
agency for effecting delivery and settlement of contracts between all members. The 
days on which members pay or receive the amounts due to them are called pay-in or 
pay-out days respectively. 
 
• Crore – The Indian numeric system. 1 crore = 10,000,000 or 10 million. 
 
• Total value traded/GDP – This ratio measures the number of stocks traded in relation 
to the size of the economy. 
 
• Volume of Trading – The total number of shares, which change hands in a particular 
company’s securities. It is the sum of either purchases or sales, which necessarily 
equal. This information is useful in explaining and interpreting fluctuations in share 
prices. 
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(b) Bombay On Line Trading (BOLT) System (taken from the BSE website 
www.bseindia.com) 
 
The Exchange, which had an open outcry trading system, has switched over to a fully 
automated computerized mode of trading known as BOLT (BSE On Line Trading) System. 
This system, which is both order and quote driven, was commissioned on March 14, 1995. It 
facilitates more efficient processing, automatic order matching and faster execution of trades. 
Above all, the system is more transparent for investors, while allowing members to keep their 
clients’ positions confidential as compared to the earlier regime where the counterparty was 
always known. The members now enter orders/quotes on the Trader Work Stations (TWSs) in 
their offices instead of assembling in the trading ring. 
The Exchange has obtained permission from Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI) for expansion of its BSE-On-Line-Trading (BOLT) network to locations outside 
Mumbai. In terms of the permission granted by SEBI and certain modifications announced 
later, the members of the Exchange are free to install their trading terminals at any place in 
the country. However, the Exchange had earlier signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) with eleven regional stock exchanges permitting it to install the BOLT terminals in 
their jurisdictional areas. The Exchange has accordingly decided, for the time being, to allow 
its members to install BOLT terminals in all metro cities and other areas having stock 
exchanges who have not signed a MOU with the Exchange.  
 
